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We perform an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic consequences of international 
terrorism and interactions with alternative forms of collective violence. Our analysis is based 
on a rich unbalanced panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 
2000, which brings together information from the Penn World Table dataset, the ITERATE 
dataset for terrorist events, and datasets of external and internal conflict. We explore these 
data with cross-sectional and panel growth regression analysis and a structural VAR model. 
We find that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant 
negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that 
associated with either external wars or internal conflict. As well, terrorism is associated with a 
redirection of economic activity away from investment spending and towards government 
spending. However, our investigation also suggests important differences both regarding the 
incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among different sets of countries. In 
OECD economies, in particular, terrorist incidents are considerably more frequent than in 
other nations, but the negative influence of these incidents on growth is smaller. 
JEL classification: E6, h1, H5, D74, O11. 
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There has been a long tradition among economists to try to understand the economic conse-
quences of conﬂict and peace. In the aftermath of World War I and leading up to World War
II, for example, several leading economists, among them Keynes (1919), Pigou (1940), Meade
(1940) and Robbins (1942), sought to trace through the interactions between war, peace and
the economic situation of their day, and applied economic reasoning to oﬀer pertinent pol-
icy advice.1 In comparison to external wars and internal conﬂict, however, terrorism—and,
in particular, its economic consequences—has received much less attention in the economic
literature. But our attention has changed in the post September 11th era. The heightened
awareness of the human cost associated with terrorist events as well as the signiﬁcant redi-
rection of economic resources, presumably motivated by the perceived risks associated with
possible future terrorist incidents, have refocused eﬀorts towards a better understanding of
terrorism and its economic consequences.
The objective of this study is to make progress towards an examination of the macroe-
conomic consequences of terrorism. Our analysis is based on a rich unbalanced panel data
set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 2000, which brings together in-
formation from the Penn World Table dataset, the ITERATE dataset for terrorist events,
and datasets of external and internal conﬂict. Using these data, and building on earlier
work on conﬂict in political science and economics, we perform an empirical investigation
of the macroeconomic consequences of international terrorism and interactions with alterna-
tive forms of collective violence. As part of our analysis, we document the pervasive nature
1More recently, researchers have also taken great strides to understand these interactions between conﬂict
and economic well being. Garﬁnkel (1990), Grossman (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Hess and Orphanides (1995,
2001a,b), and Alesina and Spolaore (1997) have extended our understanding in the direction of arming,
insurrection, appropriation, diversionary conﬂict, form of governance, and the number and size of nations.
1of international terrorism since 1968, and juxtapose its frequency and impact on economic
activity in comparison to internal and external conﬂict. Then, we investigate the dynamic
interactions between these alternative forms of collective conﬂict and their consequences on
economic growth based on cross country growth regressions, panel data regressions, and
structural VARs.
Our results suggest that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an eco-
nomically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and
less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conﬂict. As well,
terrorism is associated with a redirection of economic activity away from investment spend-
ing and towards government spending. However, our investigation also suggests important
diﬀerences both regarding the incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among
diﬀerent sets of countries. Terrorist incidents appear considerably more frequent in more de-
veloped nations than in other nations. On the other hand, the negative inﬂuence of terrorist
incidents on growth appears most signiﬁcant in the developing world.
To put our analysis into perspective, we note that political scientists have long em-
phasized that terrorism has been a constant source of worldwide tension through much of
the post World War II era, and indeed the very origin of the term points to a long history,
dating back to the late 1700s.2 In her seminal contribution on the causes of terrorism, Cren-
shaw (1981), identiﬁes modernization, ‘social facilitation’ and the spread of revolutionary
ideologies as important factors that drive terrorism. This political theory serves as a useful
point of departure for empirical investigations of terrorism. Modernization can isolate cer-
tain groups while at the same time provide more cost eﬀective ways of equipping these same
2The word “terrorism” apparently ﬁrst appeared in the English language in reference to the “Reign of
Terror” associated with the rule of France by the Jacobins from 1793-94.
2groups. This view of modernization suggests that terrorism may be more prevalent in higher
income countries (i.e OECD countries) which tend to experience higher rates of technological
progress.3 Social facilitation or ‘social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use
of violence against the government’ (p. 382) is another way of saying that internal violence
begets violence. This points to the importance of controlling for interactions between terror-
ism and other forms of conﬂict in order to identify the economic consequences of the former,
a consideration we incorporate into our analysis. Crenshaw’s ﬁnal factor comes in such a
variety in the data (e.g. nationalism, religion, etc.) that its exploration from an economic
perspective is beyond the scope of this paper.
A few economic researchers have also examined theoretical aspects of the incidence
of terrorism. Lapan and Sandler (1988, 1993) present game theoretic analyses of terrorism,
and Garﬁnkel (2003) examines the interactions between terrorism and other types of conﬂict.
On the empirical side, Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) and Enders and Sandler (1993)
assess the eﬀectiveness of terrorist-thwarting policies on reducing the incidence of terrorism,
O’Brien (1996) looks at the role of terrorism as a foreign policy tool and work by Enders,
Sandler and Parise (1992) and Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2003, 2004) examine some
of the eﬀect of terrorism on the economy.
The economic literature has therefore reinforced the political science literature by
stressing terrorism’s important link to institutions and other forms of conﬂict and pointing
to the possible economic consequences of these factors. Drawing on this earlier literature, in
our investigation of the economic consequences of terrorism we attempt to control several of
these factors and the interaction of of terrorism with other forms of conﬂict.
3See also Krueger and Maleckova (2002) for analysis consistent with this view.
32 The Data and Empirical Regularities
In this section, we describe our data sources and limitations and examine some basic em-
pirical regularities of the resulting dataset. In constructing the data set, our goal is to
benchmark terrorism data with the standardized and broadly accepted international eco-
nomic data source—the Penn World Table data, based on the work by Summers and Heston
(1991).4 This has certain implications for the organization of our data. Importantly, since
our benchmark is given as a country-year panel, we must convert data on the incidence
of terrorism (and other variables) accordingly. To allow for examination of possible strate-
gic complementarity and substitutability across forms of collective violence, we include other
standard measures of conﬂict including: measures of internal conﬂict such as genocide, ethnic
war, revolutions and irregular regime changes; and measures of external conﬂict that allow
for both home and away wars. The addition of these variables also permits us to exam-
ine some measurement issues associated with the possible mis-classiﬁcation of various forms
of conﬂict. Our intent is to examine the interaction between terrorism and the economy,
controlling for the possible interactions between these types of conﬂict.
Our data are obtained from four diﬀerent sources. To measure terrorist activities, we
employ the latest update of the “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events”
(ITERATE) data set from Mickolus et. al. (2002). The economic data are obtained from an
update of the Summers and Heston (1991) (Penn World Table) data set. Using this dataset,
we can calculate annual per-capita GDP growth rates and related variables in PPP adjusted
exchange rates from 1968 to 2000. The internal conﬂict data are obtained from Gurr et. al.
(2003) and the external conﬂict data are obtained from the most recent update to Brecher,
4We also considered matching other types of data such as tourism, foreign direct investment, etc. However,
the availability of the data limited our ability to investigate the issue on a large scale.
4Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988). In all, the resulting data set covers 177 countries over 33 years
providing an unbalanced panel data set of over 4000 observations. Unlike the Penn World
Table dataset, the sources of our data on conﬂict have not been examined extensively in the
economic literature, so some additional description is warranted.
The ITERATE data set attempts to standardize and quantify characteristics, and
activities of transnational terrorist groups. An international terrorist event is deﬁned as:
“the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political
purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to
established governmental authority, when such action is intended to inﬂuence
the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims
and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location,
the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution,
its ramiﬁcations transcend national boundaries.” Mickolus et. al., (page 2).
In short, a terrorist event is required to be employed for political purposes to inﬂuence a
wider target group on an international scale. This means that events such as September 11,
2001 are included in this dataset but some other terrorism events, such as the Oklahoma
city bombing, are not deemed to meet all the relevant criteria.5
ITERATE provides a rich micro-level data set of 12,164 incidents of terrorism across
179 countries from 1968 to 2001. The raw data is grouped into four broad categories.
First, there are incident characteristics which code the timing of each event. Second, the
terrorist characteristics yield information about the number, makeup and groups involved in
the incidents. Third, victim characteristics describe analogous information on the victims
involved in the attacks. Finally, life and property losses attempt to quantify the damage of
the attack. Unfortunately, the information across many of these categories is not provided in
a consistent manner as the original source material comes from news organization resources
5As the economic data ends in 2000, September 11th is not actually included in our analysis sample.
5which may fail to report a particular factor, such as the number of victims. This presents a
signiﬁcant limitation of this dataset. Because of this limitation, we limit our attention to the
number of terrorist incidents reported, which is the most consistent measure reported in the
ITERATE dataset. Further, since we cannot control for the signiﬁcance of individual events,
for our baseline measure of terrorism incidence we deﬁne a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 if a terrorist event is recorded for a given country year and 0 otherwise. This measure
also has the advantage of deﬁning the incidence of terrorism in a manner comparable to the
incidence of other forms of conﬂict in the data set. As an alternative, we also report results
using the number of incidents-per-capita in a given year as a measure of the incidence of
terrorism.
External conﬂict is the initiation or escalation of a foreign policy crisis that results in
violence. A foreign policy crisis is deﬁned by Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) as:
“a speciﬁc act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive
a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of
involvement in military hostilities. A trigger may be initiated by: an adversary
state; a non-state actor; or a group of states (military alliance). It may be an
environmental change; or it may be internally generated.” (page 3)
A foreign policy crisis with an intensity of a speciﬁed magnitude is called a conﬂict. This
particular deﬁnition comes from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project undertaken
by Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988) which includes the initiation or escalation of a
conﬂict that warrants the highest level of severity.6
The Internal war data, obtained from Gurr et al (2003), provides data that origi-
nates from four broader categories. First, ethnic conﬂict is deﬁned as conﬂict between the
government and national ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities seeking changes
6Such a deﬁnition is used in Hess and Orphanides (1995).
6in their status. In order to be considered a war, more than 1000 individuals had to be
mobilized and 100 fatalities must have occurred. Second, genocide is deﬁned to include
the execution, and/or consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents that
result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group (genocide) or a politi-
cized non-communal group (politicide). In contrast to ethnic conﬂict, victims counted are
non-combatants and the percentage of those killed in each group is given more weight than
the number of dead. Third, revolutionary conﬂict is deﬁned as conﬂict between the govern-
ment and politically organized groups seeking to overthrow those in power. Groups include
political parties, labor organizations, or parts of the regime itself. Once again, in order to
be considered a conﬂict, more than 1000 individuals had to be mobilized and 100 fatalities
must have occurred. An example of such a conﬂict would be the Chinese Tiananmen Square
massacre of 1989. Finally, regime change includes state collapse and shifts from democratic
and authoritarian rule as deﬁned by a shift of at least 3 points on the Freedom House polity
scale.7 This measure does not include nonviolent transitions.
2.1 The Geography of Terrorist Incidents
The greatest incidence of terrorism in our sample appears in the Americas and Europe.
This might suggest that terrorism is an unfortunate consequence of wealth and freedom.
For example, after Lebanon with an average of 25.5 terrorist events per year, the United
States experiences the second highest incidence, with an average of about 20.4 terrorist
events a year, followed closely by Germany and France at 19.3 and 17.9 incidents per year,
respectively. But neighboring countries with similar income and political systems do not
7Freedom House measures the extent of democratization of a regime using two measures—civil liberties
and political rights. Both measures are scaled 1 to 7 with 1 being the most democratic.
7share such high incidence rates. Countries such as Canada (1.4 incidents per year) and
the Nordic countries such as Sweden (1.6) Norway(0.5) and Finland (0.0) do not have such
problems. Further, from 1995 to 2000, as incomes generally improved across the globe, and
democratization increased to unprecedented levels, the average number of terrorist events
per country year actually fell and remained below the long term average of about 2.0 in each
year.8 This suggests some diﬃculties in comparing the incidence of terrorism across diﬀerent
nations and time periods.
To understand some of the diﬃculties associated with interpreting the incidence of
terrorism, consider the following fact from two of the high-incidence countries mentioned
above—the United States and France. During the 1960s, 1970s and part of the 1980s, the
main perpetrator in each country came from a single organization. In the United States, the
main culprit was the FALN (Armed Front for National Liberation), a Puerto Rican sepa-
ratist group. In France, the main instigator was (CNLF) the Corsican National Liberation
Front. Yet, in both cases, during the later part of the 1980s and 1990s, both the FALN and
CNLF are virtually non-existent. Such anecdotal evidence is suggestive of many issues fac-
ing researchers dealing with these data which may complicate interpretation of the results.
Some statistics may be unduly inﬂuenced by one interest group, region or country and may
be quite hard to generalize going forward.9
Moreover, if we considered the prevalence of terrorism on a per capita basis, the re-
8Since September 11, 2001 terrorism may have again spiked upward. However, the data is not yet available
to consider such an issue. Another complication is that a nation is coded as a “recipient” of terrorism when
an incident occurs in its territory, even if another nation appears to be the primary target. For example, in
the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Africa on August 7 1998, the events are linked to Kenya and Tanzania,
and not to the United States.
9Indeed, Enders and Sander (2002) catalog the types of terrorism over time to highlight the importance
of such idiosyncrasies. From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, terrorism is predominantly motivated by
nationalism, separatism, and other more radical considerations. Since the 1990s, however, religion appears
to have played a larger role.
8lationship between governance, income and terrorism is somewhat smaller. While a simple
Spearman rank correlation shows that the correlation between the country rankings of av-
erage incidence of terrorism and the country rankings of average terrorism per capita is .60,
countries with large populations such as the United States drop in world rankings. Indeed,
as one might suspect, countries in the Middle East tend to be countries with higher rates of
terrorist incidents per capita.10
2.2 The Empirical Regularities of Conﬂict
In this subsection we examine a snapshot of the incidence of terrorism around the world and
its relationship to other forms of conﬂict and to economic growth.
Table 1 presents the basic statistics on terrorism (T), internal conﬂict (I), and external
wars (E) [both home (H) and away from home (A)]. The data are parsed in a variety of ways
to highlight possible diﬀerences across the various measures of conﬂict. The table includes
statistics regarding the mean (MEAN), standard deviation (STD), measures of ﬁrst-order
autoregressive persistence (AR1), and the sum of squares (SSQ). Finally, to highlight the
importance of possible time and country diﬀerences, we provide a breakdown of the variation
brought by each of the individual (INDIV), time (TIME) and random (RANDOM) eﬀects.
Each column provides the results from a diﬀerent parsing. Column 2 provides the results
over the entire sample. Column 3 provides the results for non-democracies (NONDEMO).
Column 4 provides results for OECD economies, which we consider our sample of high
income countries. Columns 5 through 7 provide results for Africa (AFRICA), the Middle
East (MIDEAST) and Asia (ASIA).
10As detailed later on, in our empirical analysis we examined alternative ways for controlling for population
diﬀerences but did not ﬁnd major qualitative diﬀerences relative to our baseline results that do not control
for country size.
9Table 1: Basic Statistics
INTERNAL CONFLICT (I)
STAT ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
MEAN 0.148 0.189 0.022 0.151 0.221 0.291
STD 0.355 0.392 0.148 0.358 0.416 0.455
AR1 0.869 0.860 0.805 0.829 0.892 0.900
SSQ 757.6 648.8 21.5 204.6 99.7 224.7
INDIV 0.461 0.466 0.478 0.404 0.397 0.483
TIME 0.006 0.006 −0.006 0.019 −0.008 −0.004
RANDOM 0.536 0.521 0.544 0.586 0.633 0.535
EXTERNAL HOME WARS (H)
STAT ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
MEAN 0.008 0.010 − 0.006 0.040 0.007
STD 0.090 0.100 − 0.075 0.196 0.085
AR1 0.079 0.064 − 0.106 0.064 −0.008
SSQ 48.6 42.563 − 8.949 22.086 7.941
INDIV 0.035 0.028 − 0.009 0.039 0.025
TIME 0.005 0.005 − 0.025 0.089 0.019
RANDOM 0.960 0.967 − 0.966 0.876 0.957
EXTERNAL AWAY WARS (A)
STAT ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
MEAN 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.024 0.005
STD 0.094 0.093 0.078 0.103 0.154 0.068
AR1 0.344 0.342 0.497 0.328 0.194 0.397
SSQ 53.5 36.7 5.9 16.8 13.6 4.9
INDIV 0.042 0.027 0.068 0.034 0.049 0.021
TIME 0.006 0.004 −0.003 0.009 0.092 −0.003
RANDOM 0.952 0.969 0.937 0.958 0.865 0.983
TERRORISM (T)
STAT ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
MEAN 0.269 0.233 0.425 0.153 0.382 0.274
STD 0.443 0.423 0.495 0.360 0.486 0.446
AR1 0.391 0.361 0.315 0.371 0.366 0.424
SSQ 1182.5 755.9 241.1 207.4 136.6 216.4
INDIV 0.283 0.257 0.216 0.232 0.210 0.292
TIME 0.020 0.022 0.052 0.024 0.043 0.015
RANDOM 0.698 0.718 0.741 0.749 0.760 0.703
NOBS 5840 1741 2904 2079 1551 561
Notes: MEAN, STD, AR1 refer to the data’s mean, standard deviation and ﬁrst-order autoregressive pa-
rameter, respectively. SSQ is the data’s sum of squares, with INDIV, TIME and RANDOM as the fraction
of the data’s variance that can be accounted for individual, time and random eﬀects, respectively. NOBS is
the number of observations in the sample.
10The top panel examines internal conﬂict. This occurs in about 1 out of every 7
country-years and is much more likely to occur in non-democracies and low income regions.
It is twice as likely to occur in the Middle East as in Africa, the latter of which makes
up the majority of countries in our sample. A possible suggested interpretation is that
many non-democratic and/or low-income countries are inundated with internal strife and
that conﬂict may explain, in large part, why certain countries fail to advance. Interestingly,
when considering the variance decomposition of the data, the individual eﬀect seems to be
as important as the random eﬀect, with very little variation from the time eﬀect.
Moving to panels two and three, we see something diﬀerent in the external war data.
First, external wars are a much less frequent event as even the sum of home and away wars
occur at a rate of one tenth the size of internal conﬂict. Second, while there continues to be
a “Middle East” eﬀect in external wars, the decomposition of the variation is almost entirely
driven by the random component which suggests that controlling for individual eﬀects will
be less important for external war data. Third, home and away wars behave in a much
diﬀerent manner. Indeed, for OECD economies, there are no recorded Home wars in our
data sample.
Finally, we turn our attention to the incidence of terrorism. As reported in our
dataset, terrorism occurs more frequently than other forms of conﬂict. On average, the
frequency is twice that of internal conﬂict. Its occurrence in Africa and the Middle East is
practically identical to internal conﬂict, highlighting its close relationship. This is also born
out in the variance decomposition. As can be seen, a signiﬁcant portion of the variance in
the data is driven by individual eﬀects. Interestingly, terrorism incidents are reported more
frequently in democracies and high income (i.e. OECD) countries. This is opposite to what
11was found in the other forms of conﬂict. This suggests that terrorism and internal conﬂict
are fundamentally diﬀerent and provides some assurance that the terrorism data do not
primarily capture internal conﬂict episodes, which would have implied a severe identiﬁcation
issue for our analysis.
Table 2 provides further evidence on the relationship between terrorism and other
data. Terrorism is indeed correlated with internal conﬂict—though the relationship is almost
entirely seen through country ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 2 also shows that there is a strong positive
correlation between terrorism and income—though once again entirely demonstrated through
country ﬁxed eﬀects.
Following Table 1, Table 2 parses the data across diﬀerent samples to examine the
correlation of terrorism and other forms of conﬂict with and without ﬁxed eﬀects.11 In
addition, this table examines the correlation of terrorism and variables such as GDP per
capita (y), growth (∆y), (exports+imports)/GDP (OPEN), and Gini coeﬃcient (GINI).12
The ﬁrst panel of Table 2, shows that terrorism is not highly correlated with either
home or away wars but is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with internal conﬂict. It is also
striking to see that the correlation coeﬃcient between income and terrorism is signiﬁcantly
positive at about .20. This strong positive relationship might at ﬁrst glance seem counterin-
tuitive. The unexpected relationship may in fact have more to do with an alternative third
factor that cannot be controlled for in such simple analysis as correlations. Some support for
this conjecture is suggested when we examine the correlation in democracies (0.06) and for
high income countries (−0.03), which demonstrates that for higher income countries which
are often democracies, the correlation disappears. We pursue this reasoning in section 3.
11The middle panel removes both time and ﬁxed eﬀects, though the results are nearly identical if time
eﬀects are not removed.
12The data on Gini coeﬃcients was obtained from Deininger and Squire (1996).
12Table 2: Correlations with Terrorism Across Sub-Samples
Correlation with Terrorism (T)
ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
H 0.037 0.045 0.000 0.031 0.084 0.050
A 0.056 0.089 0.062 0.127 0.055 0.084
I 0.151 0.077 0.078 0.225 0.117 0.194
y 0.197 0.060 −0.076 0.113 0.325 0.021
∆y 0.000 −0.043 −0.043 −0.021 0.055 −0.124
OPEN −0.164 −0.269 −0.207 −0.154 0.220 −0.177
GINI −0.018 0.056 0.187 −0.079 −0.178 0.090
Correlation with Terrorism: Time and Fixed Eﬀects Removed
ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
H −0.001 −0.005 −0.075 −0.026 0.030 −0.003
A 0.024 0.058 0.033 0.027 −0.011 0.044
I 0.062 −0.014 −0.022 0.029 0.068 0.063
y −0.039 −0.079 −0.054 −0.045 0.070 0.021
∆y −0.020 −0.014 −0.037 −0.013 0.024 −0.058
OPEN −0.024 −0.038 −0.055 0.056 0.000 0.001
GINI 0.014 0.051 0.030 −0.010 −0.089 −0.010
Correlation with Terrorism: Fixed Eﬀects
ALL NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
H 0.299 0.288 0.000 0.474 0.755 0.481
A 0.203 0.208 0.244 0.666 0.620 0.479
I 0.321 0.213 0.294 0.659 0.353 0.547
y 0.325 0.335 −0.032 0.223 0.562 0.036
∆y 0.140 0.025 0.228 −0.006 0.524 −0.299
OPEN −0.386 −0.494 −0.456 −0.458 0.531 −0.477
GINI 0.082 0.154 0.581 −0.142 0.001 0.309
Notes: See Table 1. Correlation coeﬃcients between Terrorism and Home wars
(H), Away wars (A), Internal conﬂict (I), GDP per capita (y), growth (∆y),
ln((exports+imports)/GDP) (OPEN), gini coeﬃcient (GINI). Panel 1 represents the gross
correlation. Panel 2 represents the correlation after removing time and ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel
3 represents the correlation of the country ﬁxed eﬀect.
13Upon further inspection, the strong positive relationship between terrorism and in-
ternal conﬂict and terrorism and income is driven by a few sub-samples. In particular, the
correlation between terrorism and internal conﬂict is twice as high in Africa than in other
regions. Furthermore, the correlation between terrorism and income is three times higher in
the Middle East than other regions. All of these results when taken together provide support
for reconsidering these same correlations without time and country eﬀects. The second panel
is devoted to this exercise.
Panel two shows that removing these eﬀects signiﬁcantly decreases the correlation
between terrorism and conﬂict, even though terrorism continues to be more correlated with
internal conﬂict (0.06) than home (−0.001) and away (0.02) wars. This panel also shows
that removing these eﬀects causes the correlation between terrorism and income and growth
to turn negative. In fact, the correlation between income and terrorism turns from positive
to negative and statistically signiﬁcant for democracies. Panel three further highlights these
points by comparing the correlation the same variables with only country eﬀects included.
The correlations between all measures of conﬂict are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
The correlations between income and terrorism are similarly high.
To summarize, there appears to be a strong and positive relationship between terror-
ism and internal conﬂict and terrorism and income or growth. It also appears that much of
this relationship is driven by country ﬁxed eﬀects—a key element we will control for below
for the following reasons. In the following section we attempt to sort out these long-run and
short-run eﬀects of terrorism on the economy as well as to understand some of the short-run
feedback between terrorism and other types of organized conﬂict.
143 Econometric Evidence
The purpose of this section is fourfold. First, we want to examine the economic impact of
terrorism within the context of the long-standing cross national growth regression literature.
Second, we wish to re-examine these results in panel regressions controlling for speciﬁc
country and year eﬀects and accounting for for possible endogeneity bias using instrumental
variables estimation. Third, we wish to establish the extent to which conﬂict and terrorism
reallocate economic activity across investment and government spending. Finally, using these
basic ﬁndings, we construct a structural VAR to examine the impact of terrorism on GDP
per capita and the interrelationship between terrorism and other forms of violence.13
3.1 Cross Country Growth Regressions
We begin these exercises by constructing our baseline model by appealing to the literature
on economic growth. The workhorse model employed in the literature is cross country
regressions (see e.g. Barro, 1997) subjected to robustness checks. As is well documented,
the majority of variables in such cross-sectional growth regressions are not found to be as
statistically or economically signiﬁcant as standard growth theory might suggest (see e.g.
Levine and Renelt, 1992). In recent years, a series of papers has sought to attack this
diﬃculty by exploiting the panel dimension of the data and by introducing a better set of
instruments for geography, policy or institutions with some promising results. For example,
Judson and Orphanides (1999) show that the adverse role of high and volatile inﬂation
on growth becomes clearer in panel growth regressions than appears to be in cross-sectional
growth regressions. Frankel and Romer (1999) use a gravity model as an instrument for trade
13Hess (2004) and Blomberg and Hess (2002) explore the empirical inter-relationships between business
cycles and internal and external conﬂict.
15to demonstrate the importance of policy on growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)
use historical data on settler mortality to demonstrate the importance of institutions on
growth. However, Dollar and Kraay (2003) have recently documented that such instruments
may be weak in the sense that the results based on IV/GMM methods are not robust.
With this in mind in our analysis we report results based on cross-section and panel growth
regressions using OLS as well as estimates based on an IV/GMM approach.
Our baseline cross-country regression model includes investment as a share of GDP
(I/Y) and the log of initial GDP (lny0i) to control for transitional dynamics. We also include
a dummy for Africa (AFRICA) which researchers have consistently identiﬁed as important,
both in economic and statistical terms. Starting from this baseline model, and in line with
earlier work in this literature, we examined other policy, regional, or institutional variables
that might be important in explaining economic growth. Our ﬁndings were broadly consistent
with the early research—most institutional, geographical or policy variables tended to be
fragile in their ability to statistically inﬂuence economic growth. Hence, we only include one
more control variable (COM)—a dummy variable for non-oil commodity exporters—found to
be robust by Easterly and Kraay (2000) when using data that includes many small countries,
such as our own.14
∆yi = β0 + β1COMi + β2AFRICAi + β3lny0i + β4I/Yi + β5Ti + β6Ii + β7Ei + εi. (1)
where ∆yi and (I/Y )i are country i’s average per-capita growth rate and investment rate
over the full sample. For the IV/GMM counterparts to our baseline models, we followed the
suggestion in De La Croix and Doepke (2003) and controlled for the possible endogeneity
14We found the trade measure COM was more robust than either a measure of openness or a dummy
variable for oil. The negative coeﬃcient associated with COM may indicate that the variable is a proxy
for countries that are susceptible to trade shocks but do not have the revenue associated with oil. This is
consistent with what was found in Easterly and Kraay (2000).
16bias by employing initial values of the transitional variables as instruments.15
Table 3 reports the results from the cross-sectional growth regressions. Column 1
is the base case following the early 1990s growth literature. Columns 2 and 3 sequentially
include terrorism (T) and internal conﬂict (I). Columns 4 and 5 include external conﬂict
separate and then together with other forms of conﬂict to demonstrate how the diﬀerent
types of conﬂict inﬂuence growth. Columns 6 through 10 repeat the same regressions with
one change—IV/GMM is employed to instrument for the endogeneity of investment.
Column 1 yields the standard results for growth—investment has a positive impact
and initial income, Africa and commodity exporters have a negative impact—each statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at all conventional levels. In fact, the sign of these eﬀects are all quite similar
to what others have shown using diﬀerent techniques and data samples. The only impact
that appears to be slightly diﬀerent is the coeﬃcient on initial GDP, which is smaller primar-
ily because we employ GDP in 1967—the year before the terrorism data is available—and
not 1960 which is typically used.
Column 2 provides our ﬁrst direct estimate on the impact of terrorism. The impact is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant, implying that if a country were to experience a terrorist
event in each year in the sample, per capita growth would drop by about 1.5 percent. To
estimate the impact of one conﬂict for a given year, we must divide the coeﬃcient by 33.
While the impact may seem small, it is actually somewhat higher than the impact of internal
conﬂict on growth which is given in Column 3.
Column 4 provides more evidence on conﬂict’s impact on growth. In this case, we see
that external conﬂict appears to have a large and negative impact. Yet, we see that the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18impact of external war is not statistically signiﬁcant even when considered with other forms
of conﬂict.
It is possible that these eﬀects appear small because of endogeneity bias. To address
this issue, columns 6 through 10 show the impacts on growth using the IV/GMM speciﬁca-
tion. We see the general results carry through suggesting the presence of a robust, though
economically small, impact of both terrorism and internal wars on growth. More reassur-
ing is the fact that formal tests of the exogeneity of our instruments demonstrate that the
model is not rejected at the 5 percent level. However, while the magnitude of the coeﬃcients
are higher on the conﬂict variables, the magnitude is actually smaller on I/Y implying our
instruments may not be as strong as one would like.16
There are several possible interpretations of the strong statistical (though small in
an economic sense) impact of terrorism in Table 3. First, since the data in Table 3 is purely
cross-sectional, there may be important ﬁxed eﬀects that are dominating the information in
the data. One way to control for this is to include dummies such as COM and AFRICA, but
this is crude at best. Moreover, given our ﬁndings in Tables 1 and 2, it might be surprising
that the coeﬃcient on terrorism and growth or consumption is negative, given the strong
positive correlation in the ﬁxed eﬀect terms.
Second, since the data is cross-sectional, the regression may be capturing only the long
run eﬀect of terrorism on growth or consumption. It may be of greater interest to examine
separately the short- and long-run impact of terrorism given that much of the concern about
the economics of terrorism may be related to its impact on ﬁnancial markets which may have
16We repeated the same exercise using consumption growth as the dependent variable instead of economic
growth. The rationale for this regression is that standard economic theory suggests that utility is a function
of consumption, not output. The results (not shown) for consumption growth are very similar to those
presented for output.
19a more transitory relationship to growth.
Finally, we may estimate a small economic impact because the impact is in fact
small. The main point here is that although results based on cross-sectional regression, such
as presented in Table 3, are suggestive, there are signiﬁcant challenges in interpreting them.
Since we are unable to diﬀerentiate between long and short run and ﬁxed eﬀects bias, we
turn our attention to panel regressions and later also examine the data from the viewpoint
of a structural VAR.
In Table 4, we reexamine the evidence presented in Table 3 with panel regressions
and also examine various country sub-samples (NONDEMO, OECD, AFRICA, MIDEAST,
ASIA). In these regressions we control for time (year) and ﬁxed (country) eﬀects as well as
for the openness of a country. The resulting speciﬁcation is:
∆yit = γ0 + γ1lnopit−1 + γ3lnyit−1 + γ4I/Yit−1 + γ5Tit + γ6Iit + γ7Eit + φZ + εit (2)
where Z is a set of time and country ﬁxed eﬀects and φ is a vector of corresponding coeﬃ-
cients.17
Column 1 once again shows that I/Y and lagged GDP per capita are statistically
signiﬁcant and have the theoretically predicted sign. Openness, lnop, is also statistically
signiﬁcant and positively signed—consistent with theory. In columns 1 through 4 we are
able to estimate the impact of diﬀerent types of conﬂict on growth, controlling for time
and ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on terrorism continues to be negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is much larger than in
17As a robustness check, we have also examined numerous alternatives to the baseline shown in the table.
The results are broadly similar if we consider consumption growth as the dependent variable, if we include
various institutional and policy variables, if we use instruments for investment and openness, if we estimate








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21the cross-section implying a terrorist attack reduces growth by about 0.5 percent in a given
year. Analogously, internal conﬂict and external conﬂict also have much higher impacts than
in the cross-sectional case. In fact, they each have a much larger impact on growth than
does terrorism.
Columns 5 through 10 provide the results for other sub-samples—OECD, AFRICA,
ASIA, MIDEAST and NONDEMO countries. The results are broadly consistent for the
Africa, Asia and non-democratic columns. However, the impact of terrorism is only statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in Africa.
As a robustness check regarding the measurement of the incidence of terrorism, in
Table 5 we consider the results using an alternative deﬁnition, the number of incidents per
capita. To this end, for every country/year, we redeﬁne T as the number of terrorist incidents
in a country during that year per 100,000 persons. Table 5 suggests that this alternative
indicator yields results that are broadly consistent with those reported for our baseline
indicator in Table 4. To aid the interpretation of the estimated impact of terrorism in Table
5, note that the mean value of terrorist incidents per-million is 0.2 per year, with a standard
deviation is 1.0. Hence, according to the estimated coeﬃcient on terrorism per-capita for
the full sample of approximately −0.25, a one standard deviation increase in the incidence of
terrorist activity (e.g. raising the number of incidents from 0.2 to 1.2 incidents per-million
of population per year) is associated with a reduction in per-capita real gdp growth of about
one-quarter of a percentage point.
In summary, the results from our cross-country and panel regression analysis point
to a common ﬁnding. Terrorism appears to have a statistically strong though economically

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23of conﬂict and endogeneity concerns. However, terrorism’s drag on growth appears smaller
than that of internal conﬂict or external war. In short, the incidence of terrorism is associated
with a small, though signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect on growth.
3.2 Compositional Eﬀects
The central ﬁnding from the results reported above is that economic activity appears to be
impaired by conﬂict. The economic mechanisms which generate the slowdown in economic
activity are, however, diﬃcult to untangle using aggregate macroeconomic data. From a the-
oretical standpoint, though, there are a number of possible candidates for why conﬂict may
have an impact on economic activity. First, conﬂict and terrorism can have an immediately
negative eﬀect on output to the extent that it destroys production inputs. Second, conﬂict
and terrorism can severely interrupt economic activity by disrupting household and business
spending plans, which can also quickly translate into reduced output. Third, conﬂict and
terrorism may lead to a reallocation of economic activity within a country away from more
productive types of spending to spending that is intended to improve the nation’s security.
Unfortunately, given the relatively poor quality of cross country data, we cannot sort
through these hypotheses beyond acknowledging that they may all have harmful eﬀects on
economic activity We can, however, examine the extent to which a country’s investment rate
(I/Y )—that is the ratio of investment to GDP—and government spending rate (G/Y )—
that is the ratio of government spending to GDP—are aﬀected by conﬂict and terrorism. A
decline in the investment rate and a rise in the government spending rate would be consistent
with conﬂict and terrorism leading to a reallocation of resources away from the accumulation
of productive inputs through reduced investment spending, towards increased spending on




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25this examination in Table 6. The models employed in the table are very similar to those
in equation (2), except that we place the investment and government spending rates as the
dependent variables, and remove the investment rate as an explanatory variable.
The results in Table 6 provide some informative ﬁndings. First, the data indicate
that terrorism has a strong and negative impact of about half of a percentage point on the
investment to GDP ratio. Indeed, as the results in columns 1 to 4 indicate, terrorism has a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the investment ratio, though the other types
of conﬂict do not. This suggests that even though terrorism has been shown to have the
smallest eﬀect on GDP growth, investment spending tends to adjust more negatively to
terrorism than do other spending components of GDP. The results in columns 5 through 8,
replace the investment share of GDP as the dependent variable with the government spending
share of GDP. The results indicate that both terrorism and internal conﬂict tend to make
the government spending rate rise in relation to overall economic activity, with the eﬀect of
internal conﬂict being approximately twice as large as that for terrorism. Notice in particular,
that for terrorism the rise in the government spending ratio, approximately 0.4 percentage
points, tends to oﬀset the decline in the investment spending ratio, approximately −0.4
percentage points. Taken together, the results indicate that while overall economic activity
falls in the face of terrorism, government spending seems to get crowded in while investment
spending tends to get crowded out, though the eﬀect is modest.18
18Examination of country sub-samples (not shown) suggests that these results are strongest in AFRICA
and NONDEMO countries. The results are broadly similar if we use the alternative deﬁnition of terrorism
employed in Table 5.
263.3 A Structural VAR Model
While the results in the earlier sections analyzed the impact of conﬂict on growth and the
re-allocation of economic activity, there is a sense in which some of these inﬂuences may
be confounded or mis-attributed due to the dynamic interactions between types of conﬂict.
Indeed, given the interactions between types of conﬂict documented in Tables 1 and 2,
parsing out the separate eﬀects of internal conﬂict from terrorism on economic activity may
be particularly challenging. Moreover, given the likely possibility that alternative forms of
organized conﬂict may be strategic complements are substitutes for one another, a fuller
accounting for the eﬀects of terrorism on economic activity.
Our approach is to analyze the issues within a structural vector autoregression (VAR).
The beneﬁts from this are that while we do not have direct restrictions to impose from a
theoretical model, we do have a plausible identifying structure that we can test using over-
identifying restrictions.
Consider the following four variable VAR that includes, in order, the log-level of
real GDP per-capita, as well as dummy variables for internal conﬂict, external conﬂict and
terrorism.19 Such a VAR allows for economic activity to aﬀect the probability of conﬂict,
for economic activity to feedback onto conﬂict and it also allows for each type of conﬂict to
dynamically interact with other types of conﬂict.20 The lag length for the VAR estimates is
set at two and, as explained above, we also include ﬁxed eﬀects and time eﬀects in the VAR.
We label the reduced form innovations, eYt, eTt, eEt, eIt from the VAR where the residuals
19The VAR also includes lagged investment and openness as exogenous right hand side variables. They
are included to provide continuity with our panel regressions presented above. We also combine home and
away external conﬂicts to keep the analysis more parsimonious.
20The conﬂict equations in the VAR are simply dynamic linear probability equations. The coeﬃcient
estimates from these linear conﬂict equations are similar to those that one obtains from the marginal eﬀects
from a dynamic Probit speciﬁcations.
27are from the output, terrorism, external conﬂict and internal conﬂict equations, respectively.
It is straightforward to show that this four variable VAR can identify 6 oﬀ-diagonal elements
of the variance-covariance matrix, and that by estimating fewer than 6 elements we can test
the system’s over-identifying restrictions. As such, the estimation scheme will also provide
a mapping from the reduced from errors, e, to the structural innovations, .
Our approach to identiﬁcation is two-fold. First, based on economic intuition, broad
historical evidence, and the evidence presented above, conﬂict can clearly have an eﬀect on
economic activity within period. We incorporate this into our model through equation (3)
which states that output responds to shocks in the other endogenous variables within a year.
eYt = α1 · Tt + α2 · Et + α3 · It + yt (3)
eTt = α4 · It + Tt (4)
eEt = α5 · It + Et (5)
eIt = It (6)
The second identiﬁcation restriction is that internal conﬂict is a driving force for other types
of conﬂict, as seen in equations (4) and (5) where terrorism and external conﬂict respond
to shocks from internal conﬂict. Finally, equation (6) indicates that internal conﬂict is the
most exogenous variable in the system that depends only on itself within period.
The justiﬁcations for our identiﬁcation restriction are three-fold: First, there is a
statistical basis for the selection. Since, we have no strong priors on an identiﬁcation strategy,
our approach was to examine the broadest possible set that were eligible (see Table 7). From
this set, the above model not only seemed quite plausible but more importantly was the model
for which the over-identifying restrictions were not rejected. Second, political theory suggests
28that internal conﬂict impacts terrorism. As ﬁrst described in Crenshaw (1981), terrorism
may be determined by internal conﬂict. Third, internal conﬂict is quickly becoming one of
the primary culprits named in the escalation of violence today. Of the 25 conﬂicts listed
by Stockholm International Peace Institute in 2000, all but 2 were internally motivated.
And policy-makers have been quick to respond. The World Bank has recently developed a
research group called “The Conﬂict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit” to examine such
issues with resources devoted from a “Post-Conﬂict Fund.”21
Table 7 provides the estimates of the four variable structural VAR described in ex-
pressions (3) − (6). Each column provides the estimated coeﬃcients a1 − a5, and standard
errors for a diﬀerent sample: the full sample, non-democracies, OECD, Africa, the Middle
East and Asia, respectively. As well, the bottom part of the table provides the p-values from
a number of tests of over-identifying restrictions: p-value 1 is the p-value from the test of the
restrictions embodied in equations (3) to (6).22 The remaining p-values are for alternative
speciﬁcations that allow for all shocks to conﬂict to have a
contemporaneous eﬀect on output, but varying combination of interactions between
the conﬂict variables.23
There are three main ﬁndings presented in the Table 7 consistent with our earlier
results. First, each form of conﬂict harms growth with terrorism providing the least eco-
21Some of the resulting research was compiled in a special 2002 issue of Journal of Conﬂict Resolution
entitled “Understanding Civil War.”
22This p-value is derived from a χ2 test with 1 degree of freedom.
23More speciﬁcally, p-value 2 is the p-value from a structural VAR model where α4 = α5 = 0 so that
internal conﬂict does not have a contemporaneous eﬀect on terrorism and external conﬂict. P-value’s 3
(4) are from structural VAR’s where conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on output but only terrorism
(external) conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on internal and external (terrorism and internal) conﬂict.
P-value 5 is from a structural VAR where conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on output but only external
and internal conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on terrorism. P-value 6 is a restricted version of the
model in equations (3) − (6) where a5 = 0: in other words, only innovations to internal conﬂict have a
contemporaneous eﬀect on innovations to terrorism. There is one degree of freedom for p-value tests 3
through 5, and two degrees of freedom for p-value tests 2 and 6.
29Table 7: Structural VAR Evidence
Sample Full NONDEMO OECD AFRICA MIDEAST ASIA
a1 −0.475∗ −0.765∗∗ −0.169 −1.524∗∗ 0.029 −0.316
[0.247] [0.379] [0.219] [0.723] [0.754] [0.372]
a2 − 4.307∗∗∗ − 6.094∗∗∗ 1.243 −1.966 −2.130 − 4.615∗∗∗
[0.895] [1.282] [1.430] [2.327] [1.800] [1.365]
a3 −1.267∗∗ −1.531∗∗ − 3.232∗∗∗ − 2.933∗∗∗ 0.889 −0.567
[0.525] [0.659] [1.170] [1.130] [1.617] [0.694]
a4 7.735∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ −14.303 19.646∗∗ 23.817∗ −2.896
[3.344] [3.518] [18.505] [9.045] [13.447] [7.714]
a5 4.188∗∗∗ 5.033∗∗∗ −5.760∗∗ 12.163∗∗ 5.409 2.682
[0.923] [1.035] [2.827] [5.765] [5.627] [2.085]
p-value 1 0.242 0.376 0.388 0.567 0.569 0.542
p-value 2 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.023 0.222 0.539
p-value 3 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.038 0.308 0.195
p-value 4 0.026 0.001 0.477 0.033 0.071 0.684
p-value 5 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.035 0.336 0.199
p-value 6 0.035 0.005 0.511 0.080 0.177 0.774
NOBS 4019 2438 835 1267 252 592
Notes: See Table 4. The model is from a Structural VAR presented in the text, equations (3) − (6).
eYt = α1 · Tt + α2 · Et + α3 · It + yt
eTt = α4 · It + Tt
eEt = α5 · It + Et
eIt = It
The e’s are the reduced form residuals for output, terrorism, external conﬂict and internal conﬂict, and  are
the structural shocks. P-value 1 is the p-value from the χ2(1) test of the restrictions embodied in equations
(3) to (6). P-value 2 is the p-value from a χ2(3) test of the structural VAR model where α4 = α5 = 0. P-
value 3 (4) is from a χ2(1) test of a structural VAR’s where conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on output
but only terrorism (external) conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on internal and external (terrorism and
internal) conﬂict. P-value 5 is a χ2(1) test from a structural VAR where conﬂict has a contemporaneous
eﬀect on output but only external and internal conﬂict has a contemporaneous eﬀect on terrorism. P-value
6 is the χ2(2) test from is a restricted version of the structural VAR model where a5 = 0.
30nomically signiﬁcant impact. As indicated by the estimated coeﬃcients for α1 through α3
the estimate contemporaneous eﬀect of terrorism, external conﬂict and internal conﬂict on
output is approximately −0.5, −4.3 and −1.3 percentage points, respectively. Second, there
are strong complementarities between the various forms of conﬂict. As indicated by the esti-
mated coeﬃcients for α4 and α5, shocks to internal and external conﬂict lead to a signiﬁcant
increased probability of terrorism. This indicates that internal conﬂict tends to crowd in
other types of conﬂict, including terrorism. Finally, as indicated by the p-value 1, the over-
identifying restriction cannot be rejected at or below the 0.1 level of statistical signiﬁcance.
In sum, these ﬁndings indicate that our earlier ﬁndings are robust to allowing for dynamic
eﬀects of conﬂict on output as well for dynamic interactions among the conﬂict variables.
Figure 1 provides a plot of the impulse response function for the full sample estimate
of the structural VAR. The ﬁgure is arranged so that each column demonstrates the dynamic
response of the row variables to a one standard deviation shock to the variable denoted at
the top of the column. For example, starting from the upper most left corner, we depict a
one standard deviation shock to output on output, terrorism, external conﬂict and internal
conﬂict, respectively. Columns 2 through 4 continue the exercise with the shocks from
terrorism, external and internal conﬂict, respectively. Along with the dynamic response, the
90 percent conﬁdence interval is also plotted. These bands are computed using the technique
pioneered by Sims and Zha (1999).
The impulse responses in Figure 1 demonstrate a number of key ﬁndings. First,
the direct negative impact from external and internal shocks to GDP is much larger and
longer-lived than from terrorism. So, while the eﬀect of terrorism on economic activity
is contemporaneously negative and signiﬁcant, its eﬀects quickly dissipate even after one






























































































































































20.0year. In contrast, the eﬀect of external war are signiﬁcant and negative for up to 3 years,
while internal conﬂict has a negative, signiﬁcant and worsening eﬀect on output for the
ﬁrst few years, which continues to be signiﬁcant after 6 years. Second, there are strong
contemporaneous complementarities between internal conﬂict and terrorism but there is no
feedback with external conﬂict. This may mean that terrorism and internal conﬂict provide
triggers to one another providing an additional indirect inﬂuence on growth. Figure 1 shows
that not only do innovations to internal conﬂict tend to drive up terrorism, but innovations
to terrorism itself drives up internal conﬂict. However, shocks to external conﬂict do not
appear to drive up other types of conﬂict; rather, they appear to signiﬁcantly lessen the
likelihood of internal conﬂict in the short run.24
The sub-sample estimates of the structural VAR in Table 7 provide a number of addi-
tional ﬁndings regarding the signiﬁcance of non-democratic and developing countries. First,
the contemporaneous impact of terrorism on output is signiﬁcant only for non-democracies
and Africa. In particular, the eﬀect for Africa is extremely large. Africa is dramatically
aﬀected economically by terrorism and internal conﬂict, and internal conﬂict has a partic-
ularly strong and synergistic eﬀect on external conﬂict and terrorism. This suggests that
eﬀorts directed towards quelling internal conﬂict may be especially valuable in Africa as a
means towards improving prospects for economic growth. Second, for OECD economies,
internal shocks have a much larger impact and negative contemporaneous aﬀect on output,
than does terrorism. Moreover, shocks to internal conﬂict tend to lessen external conﬂict
in OECD economies, rather than increase them as in the full sample. Finally, the over-
identifying restriction for the structural VAR, p-value 1, is not rejected at or below the
24As an aside, it also appears that internal conﬂict falls in response to positive shocks to output—perhaps
a useful lesson for those who believe that poor economic activity can trap countries into continuing levels of
violence—see Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2002).
3210 percent level for any of the sub-samples providing strong support for our identiﬁcation
strategy.25 This provides indirect evidence consistent with the theory originally put forth in
Crenshaw (1981).
4 Conclusion
Using a unique data set that provides information on the incidence of international terrorism
around the world over four decades, we have endeavored to examine some basic facts regard-
ing the consequences of terrorism on economic activity. We have found that on average, the
incidence of terrorism may have an economically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on growth, albeit
one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external
wars or internal conﬂict. Further, the incidence of terrorism appears to be associated with
a diversion of spending from investment towards government expenditures. We also identify
diﬀerences across geographic areas and political governance both regarding the incidence as
well as the likely consequences of terrorism. For advanced economies, as captured by our
OECD sample, the evidence of a negative association between the incidence of terrorism and
economic growth appears to be smaller and is not statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁrst re-
sults, however, should be interpreted with caution. In particular, the relatively poor quality
of data regarding individual terrorism incidents forces us to concentrate on measures of the
incidence of terrorism that may be much more noisy than our data on the incidence of other
forms of conﬂict, complicating comparisons. Further, to the extent the nature of terrorism
has evolved in ways we cannot detect with our data, we may not be able to rely on the
historical evidence with much conﬁdence as a guide of the consequences of terrorism in the
25While the p-values do reveal that more parsimonious and some alternative identifying schemes also pass
this test, they do not do so for all sub-samples.
33future. Nonetheless, our results suggest that the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism
are potentially quite signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the need for a redoubling of public policy eﬀorts
towards examining how to best mitigate the associated risk.
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